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INTRODUCTION 
Arby's has a constitutional right to just compensation for the government's taking 
of its real property. Despite its rights, Arby's has been continually denied severance 
damages. Because Utah Dept. of Transp. v. Admiral Beverage Corp., 275 P.3d 208 
(Utah 2011) {"Admiral Beverage") overturned the prior ruling in this case and determined 
Ivers I was wrongly decided, the jury verdict in this case should be reversed and 
remanded so that Arby's can seek its remedy under the appropriate standards as set forth 
in Admiral Beverage. 
RESPONSE TO UDOT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
UDOT has not contested any of the fact statements Arby's set forth in support of 
this appeal. 
ARBY'S STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS 
Arby's sets forth the following additional facts in support of its appeal. 
1. On or about March 13, 2003, UDOT filed its Motion in Limine. R. at 42-
67. UDOT's Motion in Limine sought to preclude Arby's from having any experts 
testify on Arby's behalf at trial about severance damages. Id. at 44. 
2. On or about March 31, 2003, Arby's filed its Memorandum in Opposition 
to UDOT's Motion in Limine and in Support of its Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment. R. at 71-124. 
3. On or about May 22, 2003, the district court entered its Order granting 
UDOT's Motion in Limine and denying Arby's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
1 
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R. at 150-161. The district court's Order precluded Arby's from seeking any severance 
damages. 
4. So that Arby's could commence an appeal, the district court certified its 
Order as final on November 10, 2003. R. at 196-97. 
5. After the Order was certified as final, Arby's filed its first Notice of Appeal 
on December 1, 2003. R. at 212-13. 
6. On April 29, 2004, the Utah Court of Appeals issued a Memorandum 
Decision holding the district court's Order was not final and appealable. R. at 220-27. 
7. On February 17, 2005, the parties filed their Stipulation for Judgment. R. 
at 238-42. A copy of the Stipulation for Judgment is attached hereto for convenience as 
Addendum A. 
8. Pursuant to the Stipulation for Judgment, which allowed UDOT to 
condemn the property it needed from Arby's for the subject construction project, the sum 
of $104,500.00 was paid, including UDOT's initial deposit of $48,250.00 and an 
additional sum of $56,250.00. Id. at 239. 
9. Paragraph 8 of the Stipulation for Judgment states as follows: 
Defendants, by entering into this stipulation, do not intend to waive, and 
expressly reserve, the right to appeal issues raised in the May 22, 2004 
ruling issued by Judge Allphin in connection with UDOT's Motion in 
Limini [sic] and Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
10. Pursuant to the Stipulation for Judgment, the Final Order of Condemnation 
was entered on March 2, 2005. R. at 247-50. 
11. On March 8, 2005, Arby's filed a new Notice of Appeal. R. at 252-53. 
2 
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12. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's May 22, 2003 
Order preventing Arby's from pursuing its claim for severance damages. The court of 
appeal's opinion is set forth at Utah Dept. of Tramp, v. Ivers, 128 P.3d 74 (Utah Ct. App. 
2005). 
13. Arby's petitioned the Utah Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. Arby's 
Petition was granted. 
14. Upon granting certiorari, this Court limited the issues for review as follows: 
Whether article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution permits claims for 
compensation, and Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-10 permits presentation of 
evidence of damages, arising from an alleged easement for view or 
visibility, where the damages to the alleged easement are caused by 
construction beyond the boundaries of the landowner's property. 
A copy of the Supreme Court's April 5, 2006 Order is attached hereto for convenience as 
Addendum B. 
SUMMARY OF ARBY'S REPLY 
UDOT's Brief fails to oppose Arby's primary argument concerning the impact 
Admiral Beverage has on this appeal. In fact, UDOT concedes Admiral Beverage 
impacts this appeal by stating that because Ivers I has been partially overruled, Arby's is 
now entitled to appropriate damages, if any, for loss of visibility. While admitting the 
impact of Ivers I's reversal, UDOT's position that the issue of visibility can be segregated 
from the severance damages analysis remains contrary to the Admiral Beverage's 
holding. In Admiral Beverage, this Court called Ivers I's approach of attempting to 
segregate and apportion market value based upon artificial distinctions between 
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protectable and non-protectable property rights inconsistent with the law and unworkable. 
Admiral Beverage, Corp 275 P.3d at 208, 211 & 214 (Utah 2011). 
In a further attempt to deny Arby's from recovering severance damages, UDOT 
relies primarily upon an argument that Arby's has already been compensated for its 
severance damages except for those damages attributed to loss of visibility. This 
argument conveniently ignores the history of this case and does not accurately reflect the 
record, including the express language of the Stipulation for Judgment under which 
Arby's reserved all of its rights as impacted by the district court's denial of severance 
damages. 
UDOT has failed to acknowledge Arby's claims that the jury instructions given in 
this case were confusing and inconsistent because of their attempt to reflect the holding 
of Ivers I. Arby's has pointed out the problematic instructions and described their 
inconsistencies and the confusion they caused. UDOT has not rebutted this analysis. 
Finally, UDOT's appraiser, based upon the authority of Ivers /, testified there was 
no value for loss of view. Arby's submits the expert relied upon inappropriate material to 
render such an opinion, while at the same time acknowledging Arby's sustained at least a 
partial loss of view. In any event, the expert's conclusion is invalid under Admiral 
Beverage because he attempted to isolate and value the impact of one factor rather than 
testify about the decrease in fair market value of the remnant property caused by the 
taking. 
4 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
UDOT FAILS TO CONTEST ADMIRAL BEVERAGE'S 
IMPACT ON THIS APPEAL 
Arby's primary argument for reversal is that while this appeal was pending, this 
Court decided Admiral Beverage. Through Admiral Beverage, this Court reversed the 
prior ruling in this very case {Ivers I), which was the law upon which this matter was 
tried before a jury in the district court during April 2010. Arby's contends the reversal of 
Ivers I during the pendency of this case justifies a reversal of the verdict, which was 
based upon jury instructions and testimony from expert witnesses reflecting the 
wrongfully-decided Ivers I appeal. 
Rather than providing any authority that the Admiral Beverage ruling should not 
result in a reversal, UDOT acknowledges that "given the partial overruling of Ivers /, the 
defendants are now also entitled to an award of appropriate damages, if any, suffered by 
their loss of visibility." Appellee's Brief at p. 10. However, UDOT's suggestion that 
Arby's is only entitled to a claim for loss of visibility harkens back to Ivers Fs mistaken 
approach of segregating and apportioning market value based upon artificial distinctions 
between protectable and non-protectable property rights, which has now been reversed. 
This Court described the method of isolating and valuing factors separately as "too 
restrictive" and "unworkable in practice/5 Admiral Beverage, 275 P.3d at 211 & 214. 
According to this Court, Ivers I was "an aberration" contrary to a long line of precedent 
concerning how severance damages are to be measured. Id. at 214. 
5 
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Arby's is entitled to seek an award of its severance damages under the ruling in 
Admiral Beverage. 
POINT 2 
ARBY'S DID NOT WAIVE ANY CLAIM 
FOR SEVERANCE DAMAGES 
UDOT relies heavily upon its argument that the parties reached a settlement in 
2005 that compensated Arby's for its severance damages, except for loss of visibility. 
This argument ignores history and is not an accurate representation of the record in this 
case. Therefore, UDOT's argument should be disregarded. 
As has been well-documented in the prior appeals, Ivers I arose from the district 
court's May 22, 2003 Order, granting UDOT's Motion in Limine to preclude Arby's 
from putting on evidence of severance damages. R. at 150-161. The district court's 
ruling was based upon the causation analysis set forth in State v. Harvey Real Estate, 57 
P.3d 1088 (Utah 2002), which UDOT relied upon in its attempt to convince the district 
court that Arby's should not be allowed to put on any evidence of severance damages. 
Prior to the district court's ruling, Arby's had filed an answer asserting affirmative 
defenses based upon its right to severance damages. R. at 23-26. Additionally, in 
response to UDOT's Motion in Limine, Arby's filed a Motion for Partial Judgment 
distinguishing the Harvey Real Estate case and reasserting its right to severance damages 
generally by showing that the subject construction project, which required the 
condemnation of a portion of Arby's property, impacted numerous elements relevant to 
property value including access, traffic flows, view and visibility, zoning compliance, etc. 
6 
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R. at 68-87. Arby's Motion also reiterated that a nexus between the taking and the 
construction project was established. R. at 71-87 and 136-143. However, the district 
court disagreed. 
With the district court's ruling that there was no causal nexus, Arby's was 
precluded from pursuing its claim for severance damages. Therefore, Arby's sought to 
have the ruling certified as final so that it could appeal. The district court certified the 
ruling and Arby's filed its Notice of Appeal. However, the Utah Court of Appeals issued 
a Memorandum Decision that the district court's Order was not final and appealable. 
Following that ruling, the parties executed a Stipulation for Judgment, allowing UDOT to 
condemn the portion of Arby's property it needed for the construction project. Based 
upon the Stipulation for Judgment, the district court entered its Final Order of 
Condemnation. R. at 247-251. This allowed Arby's to appeal a final order and seek to 
have the district court's ruling precluding severance damages reversed. The Utah Court 
of Appeals eventually heard Arby's appeal and, relying heavily upon Harvey Real Estate, 
upheld the district court's Order granting UDOT's Motion in Limine. 
UDOT's Opposition Brief in the present appeal fails to acknowledge that the 
Stipulation for Judgment was entered into so that UDOT could acquire the property it 
needed for its expansion and elevation of Highway 89 and so that Arby's could file its 
appeal. Pursuant to the Stipulation for Judgment, the parties did not agree that amounts 
UDOT paid to Arby's were compensation for severance damages except for loss of view 
and visibility. "Just compensation" was paid with respect to the parcel sought to be 
7 
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acquired pursuant to the Complaint. See Addendum A hereto. The language of the 
Stipulation for Judgment, which is ignored in the Brief of Appellee, expressly reserved 
Arby's rights to seek severances damages following the district court's ruling, setting up 
Arby's appeal: 
Defendants, by entering into this stipulation, do not intend to waive, and 
expressly reserve, the right to appeal issues raised in the May 22, 2004 
ruling issued by Judge Allphin in connection with UDOT's Motion in 
Limini [sic] and Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
After the Utah Court of Appeals upheld the district court's ruling on the Motion in 
Limine, Arby's petitioned this Court for writ of certiorari. The Court granted Arby's 
Petition on a very limited basis. In this Court's Order of April 5, 2006, the issue was 
limited as follows: 
Whether article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution permits claims for 
compensation, and Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-10 permits presentation of 
evidence of damages arising from an alleged easement for view or 
visibility, where damages to the alleged easement are caused by 
construction beyond, the boundaries of the landowner's property. 
Addendum B hereto. 
Because of the narrow scope of this Court's April 5, 2006 Order, Ivers I turned 
into a case about isolating and valuing loss of view and visibility rather than whether the 
district court and the court of appeals had decided correctly regarding causation.1 As this 
1
 Admiral Beverage did not reverse the portion of Ivers I concerning causation. 
Severance damages are appropriate "when land is condemned as part of a single project -
even if the view-impairing structure itself is built on property other than that which was 
condemned - if the use of the condemned property is essential to completion of the 
project as a whole." 275 P.3d at 213 (quoting Ivers I 154 P.3d 802, 807 (Utah 2007)). 
8 
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Court acknowledged in Admiral Beverage, hers I was wrongly decided and was 
inconsistent with years of precedent concerning how fair market value of real property is 
to be assessed. Admiral Beverage, 275 P.3d at 216. 
UDOT now criticizes Arby's for never attempting to attack the Stipulation for 
Judgment because of its alleged limitation upon Arby's rights. This criticism makes no 
sense when it is understood the Stipulation for Judgment was entered long before the 
appellate courts turned Arby's severance damages claim into a futile exercise of 
segregating and attempting to value specific factors such as view and visibility. 
Additionally, as described hereinabove, the language of the Stipulation for Judgment 
expressly reserves all of Arby's rights to challenge the district court's Order foreclosing 
Arby's severance damages claim under Harvey Real Estate. In light of the express 
language of the Stipulation for Judgement, UDOT cannot argue Arby's waived its rights. 
Based upon the foregoing, UDOT cannot ignore the procedural history of this 
case, rely upon selective portions of the Stipulation of Judgment taken out of context, and 
2
 UDOT inaccurately quotes footnote 2 in the Ivers I opinion. That footnote does not say 
Arby's was compensated for all severance damages other than view and visibility. The 
Utah Supreme Court's decision to limit its review in Ivers I io whether view and visibility 
were compensable came long after the Stipulation for Judgment, which reserved 
generally Arby's severance damages claim. 
9 
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argue Arby's should not be allowed to pursue severance damages under the law as set 
forth in Admiral Beverage. 
POINT 3 
UDOT HAS NOT REBUTTED ARBY'S CLAIMS 
CONCERNING JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
Without analysis, UDOT claims Arby's has failed to show that taken as a whole, 
the jury instructions did not fairly instruct the jury. This is not correct. 
Arby's Opening Brief identifies seven substantive jury instructions having to do 
with loss of view and valuation. Point 2 of Arby's Opening Brief describes how the jury 
instructions were confusing and inconsistent. Moreover, in light of the Admiral Beverage 
ruling, the instructions were wrong. UDOT has done nothing to refute Arby's analysis 
other than to disagree with it and claim that under Jensen v. Intermountain Power 
Agency, 977 P.2d 474 (Utah 1999), the jury instructions made sense if taken as a whole. 
UDOT's Brief specifically addresses none of the jury instructions pointed out by Arby's. 
The only instruction UDOT addresses specifically is Jury Instruction No. 48 
having to do with the compensation it previously paid to Arby's. However, UDOT's 
representation of that jury instruction is inaccurate. Jury Instruction No. 48 did not 
inform the jury that Arby's had already been compensated for severance damages except 
for loss of view. Rather, it informed the jury that the "parties have reached agreement on 
For the sake of argument, even if part of the compensation UDOT paid to Arby's for the 
taking was a partial payment of severance damages, any concern regarding double 
recovery could be managed by the district court by crediting the damages award by the 
amount UDOT allegedly paid for severance damage. It would be contrary to Admiral 
Beverage to remand this case for a trial concerning loss of visibility. 
10 
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the fair market value of the property taken for the highway construction" and, consistent 
with the law as set forth in Ivers I, that the purpose of trial was to establish whether 
further damages should be awarded for the value of loss of view. R. at 814. Because of 
Ivers I, Arby's was not permitted to seek severance damages under the traditional 
analysis as reiterated in Admiral Beverage. Therefore, the jury instructions in this case 
could only reference severance damages based upon loss of view and they were entirely 
confusing in instructing the jury on how the valuation was to occur.4 
POINT 4 
UDOT'S EXPERT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN 
PERMITTED TO OPINE ARBY'S SUFFERED NO 
DAMAGES AS A RESULT OF LOSS OF VIEW 
Trial in this matter essentially boiled down to the proverbial battle of the experts. 
The trial was limited to the amount of damages resulting from loss of view. UDOT's 
witness was Philip Cook, an appraiser. Mr. Cook testified at trial that Arby's suffered 
absolutely no damage as a result of the loss of view from the property. See Philip Cook's 
trial testimony at pp. 41 and 45 (excerpts of Mr. Cook's testimony are attached hereto as 
Addendum C). Mr. Cook conceded there was at least a partial view impairment (id. at p. 
46), but he would not even allow room for an award of nominal damages. Mr. Cook also 
4
 UDOT attacks Arby's for not objecting to the jury instructions at trial, and argues that 
without objecting, Arby's cannot claim on appeal that they were improper. This 
argument must be rejected. The jury instructions were based upon this Court's decision 
in Ivers I and its mandate. Attempting to challenge the instructions and seeking to have 
the district court give instructions based upon something other than Ivers I would have 
been futile. See State v. Rothlisberger, 95 P. 3d 1193, 1202 (Utah Ct. App. 2004) (parties 
are not required to make futile objections to preserve a future claim). 
11 
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testified his appraisal was governed by his understanding of this Court's ruling in Ivers I. 
Id. at 207. He acknowledged the difficultly in attempting to isolate loss of view for 
purposes of conducting an appraisal. Id. at 2l l .5 Arby's suggests Mr. Cook's opinion 
that Arby's sustained no damages only confirms the un-workability of the Ivers I analysis 
for measuring severance damages. 
Clearly, if Mr. Cook had been precluded from relying upon hearsay and mostly 
anecdotal evidence, UDOT would have had no evidence to support its claim that Arby's 
suffered no damage, despite its admitted loss of view. The basis for Mr. Cook's opinions 
should have been rejected in advance of trial by the district court. Mr. Cook admittedly 
took information from owners of irrelevant commercial properties that their customers 
had never complained about a loss of view, then extrapolated from that information that 
loss of view causes no damage to properties like the one at issue in this case. Such 
hearsay evidence from non-experts should not have been permitted to supported Mr. 
Cook's otherwise empty opinion that Arby's sustained not one cent of damages for loss 
of view. 
5
 Arby's expert, Gary Free, also characterized the task of attempting to isolate loss of 
view as "an impossible concept" and "not in the real world." See Gary Free's trial 
testimony at pp. 34 and 59 (excerpts of Gary Free's trial testimony are attached hereto as 
Addendum D). 
12 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court should grant Arby's appeal. 
DATED this day of August, 2012. 
WINDER & COUNSEL, P.C. 
nald J. Winder 
M o W.Holt 
\\ 
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STEPHEN C. WARD (#3384) 
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MARK L. SHURTLEFF (#4666) 
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Telephone: (801) 366-0353 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
DAVIS COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMES IVERS; KATHERINE G. HAVAS, 
P and F FOOD SERVICES (Tenant); and 
ZIONS CREDIT CORPORATION, 
Defendants. 
STIPULATION FOR JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 020700665 
Judge Michael Allphin 
The parties in the matter above-entitled, the Plaintiff Utah Department of Transportation 
("UDOT") through its attorney, Stephen C. Ward, Assistant Attorney General, and the 
Defendants, James Ivers, Katherine G. Havas, P and F Food Services through their attorney 
Donald J. Winder (Zions Credit Corporation did not file an answer, and its name will not appear 
as a payee on the final settlement check), and with respect to the issues in this case now pending 
before the Court, agree and stipulate as follows: 
Stipulation for Judgment 
FEB ! 7 2005 
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1. UDOT has heretofore filed its Complaint to acquire, by eminent domain, the 
property and property interest of these Defendants located in Davis County, State of Utah, said 
property being more particularly described in said Complaint here on file as Parcel Nos. 269: A 
and 269 :E. 
2. UDOT has the right to condemn and acquire the property and property interest of 
these Defendants in said parcel for a public use. 
3. The use to which the condemned premises herein is to be placed by UDOT is 
public in nature and the court previously entered an order of immediate occupancy. 
4. Just compensation is due from UDOT to these Defendants for the acquisition of 
their interest in the property condemned by UDOT herein and for such damages to other property 
as may be recoverable under law by virtue of the acquisition as defined in the Complaint. 
5. Just compensation for the interest of these Defendants in the condemned premises 
is the sum of $104,500, and of that sum, UDOT has previously paid these Defendants the amount 
of$48,250. 
6. The Court may enter its Judgment in favor of these Defendants and against the 
Plaintiff for the sum of $104,500 less the deposit of $48,250 heretofore paid to these Defendants, 
for an unpaid balance of $56,250, which is the total amount remaining. 
7. Upon payment to these Defendants of the foregoing amount, it is further stipulated 
and agreed that UDOT will be entitled to a Satisfaction of Judgment and that the Court shall 
enter a Judgment and Final Order of Condemnation vesting in UDOT the fee simple interest of 
Defendants in and to the property more particularly described in the Complaint here on file as 
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Parcel No. 269:A and easement interests upon Defendants' remaining property identified as 
Parcel No. 269:E. 
8. Defendants, by entering into this stipulation, do not intend to waive, and expressly 
reserve, the right to appeal issues raised in the May 22, 2003 ruling issued by Judge Allphin in 
connection with UDOT's Motion in Limini and Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment. 
9. Based upon this stipulation and the trial court's May 22, 2003 ruling, no triable 
issues remain in this matter. 
10. The parties have agreed this Stipulation is contingent upon the Defendants being 
allowed a sign advertising their business on both the north and south off-ramps. The parties 
agree that such a sign can be installed. 
11. The parties agree that a Final Order will be issued in this case and will be 
recorded. The foregoing will not affect Defendants' right to appeal Judge Allphin's May 22, 
2003 ruling. 
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DATED this/r day of /' ^jfUjugyx^ , 2005. 
^ 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
JTEFpffiN g WARD 
^A§simaiit Attorney General 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
jv 
DATED thislD_ day offeV)\WV , 2005. 
i^ 
DONALD ff. WINDER 
WINDER' & HASLAM, P.C. 
Akqr neys for James Ivers, Katherine 
Havas and P&F Food Services 
G. 
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CFJRTTFTCATF OF SF.KVTCF, 
I hereby certify that on the I b y day of January, 2005, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document was sent via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Donald J. Winder 
John W. Holt 
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C. 
175 West 200 South, #4000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
- - 0 0 O 0 0 - -
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COUi 
APR 0 5 2006 
James Ivers, Katherine G. Havas, 
and P ad F Food Services, 
Petitioners, 
Utah Department of Tranportation, 
Respondent. 
Case No. 20060061-SC 
20050246-CA 
ORDER 
This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, filed on January 20, 2006. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED pursuant to Rule 45 Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is 
granted only as to the following issue: 
Whether article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution 
permits claims for compensation, and Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-10 
permits presentation of evidence of damages, arising from an 
alleged easement for view or visibility, where the damages to the 
alleged easement are caused by construction beyond the boundaries 
of the landowner's property. 
A briefing schedule will be established hereafter. Pursuant 
to rule 2, the court suspends the provision of rule 26(a) that 
permits the parties to stipulate to an extension of time to 
submit their briefs on the merits. The parties shall not be 
permitted to stipulate to an extension. Additionally, absent 
extraordinary circumstances, no extensions will be granted by 
motion. The parties shall comply with the briefing schedule upon 
its issuance. 
For The Court: 
Date A^.^4 
Christine M."Durham 
Chief Justice 
^ z — 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COCJRT 
OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE.OF UTAH 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
v s . 
JAMES IVERS, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
D e f e n d a n t , 
SECOND 
•DISTRICT COMRh-
ORIGINAL 
Case No. 020700665 
Trial Testimony of Phillip Cook 
Electronically Recorded on 
April 15, 2010 
BEFORE: THE HONORABLE MICHAEL G. ALLPHIN 
Second District Court Judge 
APPEARANCES 
For the State: 
For the Defendant: 
Randy S. Hunter 
Mark E. Burns 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEYS GENERAL 
160 East 300 South 
Fifth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)366-0953 
Donald J. Winder 
John W. Holt 
WINDER LAW FIRM 
175 West 200 South 
Suite 4000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)322-2222 
Transcribed by: Wendy Haws, CCT 
1771 South California Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84606 
Telephone: (801) 377-2927 
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Q. Why is this data collection process so important to an 
MAI appraiser? 
A. You know, appraisers are paid for their opinions, but 
their opinions are only as good as the data on which they base 
their opinion. We have a standards obligation,, an ethical 
obligation to provide appraisal work in a non — 
Q. Want to pull the microphone back towards — 
A. — in a non-misleading way, and to prove our — prove 
our opinions. Not just to pull something out of the air, but 
to 5.ctuaxj.y prove our opinions. Even tnough there's a lot of. 
anecdotal evidence clearly suggesting that view out is not 
something these fast food operators particularly care about, 
we need to go to the market to confirm that. 
Q, So you didn't rely on this anecdotal evidence in 
forming your opinions? 
A. Well, I certainly considered it, but it wasn't my 
sole reliance. 
.Q. Okay, so what's the bottom line from your case 
studies? 
A. That I cannot is — I cannot find in the marketplace 
where this changed the subject's situation, specifically-
related to view, disregarding visibility, disregarding 
accessibility, disregarding construction nuisance, which 
I can't take into account, according to the Supreme Court, 
that just this view impairment has no impact on market value. 
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A. I d i d . 
Q. You ob ta ined anecdo ta l evidence — 
A. Yes. 
Q. — from market p a r t i c i p a n t s ; and ba sed upon t h a t 
e f f o r t , t h a t r e s e a r c h , what was your c o n c l u s i o n ? 
A. I c o u l d n ' t i s o l a t e or prove or i d e n t i f y any va lue , l o s s 
or value d iminu t ion r e l a t e d t o t h i s p a r t i a l view impairment out 
t o the e a s t , o r t h i s f a s t food r e s t a u r a n t p r o p e r t y . 
MR. HUNTER: Thank you. Your Honor, migh t I approach 
for a moment? 
THE COURT: P l ea se . 
(Discuss ion a t t h e bench off the r eco rd ) 
Q. BY MR. HUNTER: So j u s t t o conclude, i t i s your 
p r o f e s s i o n a l op in ion t h a t t h e view out from t h e Arby ' s 
r e s t a u r a n t has no monetary va lue? 
A. C o r r e c t . 
Q. Thank you. If you can s t a y , because w e ' r e going t o 
need t o review some of t h e s e , i f t h a t ' s okay? 
A. I guess so . 
Q. I d o n ' t know how you got t h a t se t up. A l l r i g h t , 
thank you. Thank you. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. 
Q-
A. 
WINDER: 
Good morning, 
Good morning, 
Mr. 
Mr. 
Cook. 
Winder. 
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Q. I'd like to start' with those things, and there are 
quite a few, with which I think we can agree. Let's start 
with the view. There's no question here, but the view has 
been impaired from the Arby's restaurant? 
A. I would say there's a partial view impairment from 
the Arby's restaurant. 
Q. So there is a view impairment, yes? 
A. Yes. 
Q. All right. 
A. A partial view impairment. 
Q. You won't give me view impairment, but you'll give me 
partial? 
A. Well, I believe that's what it — what the case is. 
In other words, there's no change in most directions, and 
there's not a complete blockage of view to the east. So I 
would call it a partial view impairment. 
Q. Now, you're — you're aware that the view to the 
travel lanes of U.S. 89 has been lost? 
A. Yes. 
0. That the view of the East frontage road has been lost? 
A. Yes. 
Q. The view of the Smith's shopping center has been lost? 
A. Yes. 
Q. The lower .foothills of the Wasatch view has been lost? 
A. Yes. 
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1 Q Is it — 
2 MR. HUNTER: Your Honor, here's a copy of the — the 
3 slides. 
4 Q (By Mr. Hunter) As an appraiser, do you have to 
5 analyze legal issues as you're undertaking an assignment? 
6 A I do; of course, from an appraiser's perspective, 
7 not an attorney's perspective, but yes. 
8 Q Okay. And are these legal issues relevant in an 
9 eminent domain action? 
10 A Very much so. 
11 Q And can you explain why? 
12 A Well, the rules for appraising in the eminent domain 
13 context have come about because of the Constitution and 
14' because of statute that states have enacted to—to make sure 
15 that property owners are adequately protected. And also by 
16 case law so that, for example, this—this case, Arby's case 
17 has been before the Supreme Court a couple of times on certain 
18 rulings and so those legal rulings form the basis on which an 
19 appraisal needs to be completed in this case. 
20 Q Okay. And what, as an appraiser, do you understand 
21 to be the legal principles to be applied in—in your 
22 assignment today? 
23 A As you know, I'm sure by now, Arby's is located next 
24 to the U.S. Highway 89 and Shepherd Lane intersection. And— 
25 THE COURT: Mr. Cook, can I interrupt you just a 
207 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 so losing-that traffic by some act of the transportation 
2 department is not something that they can claim— 
3 Q • Okay. And--and I don't need you t o — 
4 " A — a damage for. 
5 Q --to get into the reasoning of the Court here. 
6 A Okay. 
7 Q Just—excuse me--your understanding of your—of the 
8 difficulty of your assignment. 
9 A So, the difficulty is, I've got to factor out any 
10 value loss that may—may have resulted from the loss of 
11 visibility. That's—that's the point. 
12 Q And how about, were there other legal issues that 
13 you had to struggle with— 
14 A Yes. 
15 Q —in this case? 
16 A Yes. 
17 Q And what were those? 
18 A The other was accessibility. It used to be that you 
19 could turn left right at the intersection, you'd pull up to 
20 the light right at the intersection of Shepherd Lane and turn 
21 ." left if you were going northbound or turn right if you were 
22 going southbound and—and go into the shopping center of which 
23 Arby's is a part. With the— 
24 Q So, a driver on a sudden impulse could just say, I'm 
25 going to turn here and go in and get an Arby's? 
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FILED i 
AU8 - .9 2010 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURTf 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-0O0-
SECOND 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
) 
) 
Plaintiff, 
vs , 
ZIONS CREDIT CORPORATION, 
JAMES IVERS, KATHERINE G. 
HAVAS, P AND F FOOD 
SERVICES, 
Defendants. ) 
) 
-0O0-
Case No. 020700665 
DAY TWO OF TRIAL 
BE .IT REMEMBERED that on the 14th day of April, 
2010, commencing at the hour of 9:02 a.m., the above-entitled 
matter came on.for hearing before the HONORABLE MICHAEL 
ALLPHIN, sitting as Judge in the. above-named Court for the 
purpose of this cause, and that the following proceedings were 
had.. . 
-oOo-
DEPOMAXMERIT 
i LITIGATION SERVICES 
333 SOUTH RIO GRANDE 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
WWW.DEPOMAXMERIT.COM 
TOLL FREE 800-337-6629 
PHONE 801-328-1188 
FAX 801-328-1189 
• A TRADITION O F QUALITY • 
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1 A You asked this morning? 
2 Q No. 
3 A Oh. 
4 Q That—yesterday afternoon. 
5 A Oh, yes. 
6 Q That—that's why you're here? 
7 ' A Yes, uh huh (affirmative). 
8 Q And—and Mr. Free, is it your opinion the 155,000 
9 represents the loss in market value due to the loss of view 
10 out at the Arby's? 
11 A No. The loss of view out is just almost impossible, 
12 if you just say the view out, only, that's—that's an 
13 impossible concept, it doesn't exist. If—how do you— 
14 Q But if--if you—and I — I would agree with you. 
15 A Yeah. 
16 Q But if we measure—if we measure the loss of view by 
17 the following formula, that the loss of view is to be measured 
18 . by the affect, the obstruction of view the elevated highway 
19 has upon the fair market value of the remainder of the 
20 property, if—if we put that whole package together, then is 
21 that your opinion as to the loss of the Arby's? 
22 A Yes. 
23 Q Okay. Thank you. 
24 MR. WINDER: I have no further questions. 
25 THE COURT: Mr. Hunter? 
34 
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1 A Well, I've been asked many times to look at a 
2 residential view and—and there is a damaged residential view. 
3 I've never been asked—so, this is new territory, I think, 
4 we're talking about here in this Court, as far as I know—I've 
5 never been asked to--to examine just a view out only of a — a— 
6 because people buy homes for a view out. They don't buy 
7 retail for a view out. So, we're all--
8 Q Yeah. 
9 A —we're all here and struggling in this courtroom— 
10 Q A fast food restaurant could care less about the 
12 A I wouldn't say care less, but it's—it's almost 
13 impossible, it's not in the real world that you can separate 
14 it out. So, I struggle with the scope of this, I almost 
15 didn't want to take the assignment, because I'm saying, well, 
16 I can't separate view out very easily; in fact, I've never 
17 seen anybody be able to really, absolutely—how do you do 
18 that? Because a view is an interactive thing, normally, for 
19 a--for a business location. So, the safety and security, all 
20 the things that go out also are reciprocal. 
21 So, yeah, I don't—I think this case that you gave 
22 me applies to residence, it's difficult to apply to an—an 
23 Arby's. 
24 Q Yeah. 
25 A But I—I can see your point, and yeah. 
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